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Abstract1
Evolutionary graph theory is a well established framework for modelling the evolution of social behaviours in2
structured populations. An emerging consensus in this field is that graphs that exhibit heterogeneity in the3
number of connections between individuals are more conducive to the spread of cooperative behaviours. In4
this article we show that such a conclusion largely depends on the individual-level interactions that take place.5
In particular, averaging payoffs garnered through game interactions rather than accumulating the payoffs6
can altogether remove the cooperative advantage of heterogeneous graphs while such a difference does not7
affect the outcome on homogeneous structures. In addition, the rate at which game interactions occur can8
alter the evolutionary outcome. Less interactions allow heterogeneous graphs to support more cooperation9
than homogeneous graphs, while higher rates of interactions make homogeneous and heterogeneous graphs10
virtually indistinguishable in their ability to support cooperation. Most importantly, we show that common11
measures of evolutionary advantage used in homogeneous populations, such as a comparison of the fixation12
probability of a rare mutant to that of the resident type, are no longer valid in heterogeneous populations.13
Heterogeneity causes a bias in where mutations occur in the population which affects the mutant’s fixation14
probability. We derive the appropriate measures for heterogeneous populations that account for this bias.15
Author Summary16
Understading the evolution of cooperation is a persistent challenge to evolutionary theorists. A contemporary17
take on this subject is to model populations with interactions structured as close as possible to actual social18
networks. These networks are heterogeneous in the number and type of contact each member has. Our19
paper demonstrates that the fate of cooperation in such heterogeneous populations critically depends on the20
rate at which interactions occur and how interactions translate into the fitnesses of the strategies. We also21
develop theory that allows for an evolutionary analysis in heterogeneous populations. This includes deriving22
appropriate criteria for evolutionary advantage.23
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Introduction24
Population structure has long been known to affect the outcome of an evolutionary process [1–4]. Evolu-25
tionary graph theory has emerged as a convenient framework for modelling structured populations [4, 5].26
Individuals reside on vertices of the graph and the edges define the interaction neighbourhoods.27
A variety of processes have been investigated on a number of graph classes. However, few analytical28
results exist in general, since an arbitrary graph may not exhibit sufficient symmetry to aid calculations.29
The most general class of graphs for which analytical results are known is the class of homogeneous (vertex-30
transitive) graphs. Such a graph G has the property that for any two vertices vi and vj there exists a31
structure-preserving transformation g of G such that g(vi) = vj . It is worth noting that not all regular32
graphs are homogeneous; an extreme example is the Frucht graph [6], which is regular of degree 3 and has33
only the trivial symmetry. Intuitively, this class consists of graphs that “look” the same from any vertex. The34
amount of symmetry in such graphs has allowed for a complete set of analytical results for restricted types35
of evolutionary processes and weak selection [7–9]. Despite the tractability of calculations on homogeneous36
graphs, natural population structures are seldom homogeneous. Therefore it is important to understand the37
effects of heterogeneous population structures on evolutionary processes [4, 8, 10] and, in particular, on the38
evolution of cooperation.39
In the simplest case there are two strategic types: cooperators that provide a benefit b to their interaction40
partner at some cost c to themselves (b > c > 0), whereas defectors provide neither benefits nor incur costs.41
This basic setup is known as an instance of the prisoner’s dilemma and reflects a conflict of interest because42
mutual cooperation yields payoff b−c > 0 and hence both parties prefer this outcome over mutual defection,43
which yields a payoff of zero. However, at the same time each party is tempted to defect in order to avoid44
the costs of cooperation. The temptation of increased benefits for unilateral defection thwarts cooperation45
– to the detriment of all. This conflict of interest characterizes social dilemmas [11,12].46
A B
A 1 S
B T 0
Table 1. The payoff matrix for a general 2 by 2 strategy game. Here S and T are real numbers.
47
More general kinds of interactions between two individuals and two strategic types, A and B, can be48
represented in the form of a 2 × 2 payoff matrix as in Table 1. The payoffs garnered from these game49
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interactions affect an individual’s expected number of offspring by altering their propensity to have offspring50
(their fitness) or their survival. The expected number of offspring is determined by the fitness of the51
individuals and some population updating process, which will be made precise in the next section. The52
offspring produced during the population update have the potential to change the strategy composition of53
the population. An increase in the abundance of one strategy over a sufficiently large time scale indicates54
that strategy is favoured by evolution.55
It can be shown, for replicator dynamics, for example [13, 14], that any payoff matrix can be reduced to56
the matrix in Table 1 without loss of generality because adding a constant term to the payoff matrix does not57
affect the dynamics and multiplying the payoffs by a positive factor merely rescales the time. Therefore we58
can always shift the payoffs such that B-B-encounters return a payoff of zero and scale all other payoffs such59
that A-A-encounters yield a payoff of 1. In the Accumulated versus Averaged Payoffs section we show that60
the generality of the matrix in Table 1 extends to other forms of stochastic dynamics in finite populations61
based on the frequency dependent Moran process [15].62
The (additive) prisoner’s dilemma introduced before corresponds to the special case with S = −c/(b− c)63
and T = b/(b − c). Rescaling the payoff matrix in Table 1 by b − c yields the traditional form, Table 2.64
More generally, the prisoner’s dilemma requires S < 0 and T > 1 to result in the characteristic conflict of65
interest outline above. The special case of the additive prisoner’s dilemma, Table 2, effectively reduces the66
game to a single parameter with T = 1− S (and S < 0). Moreover it has the special property that when an67
individual changes its strategy, the payoff gain (or loss) is the same, regardless of the opponents’ strategy –68
the so-called equal-gains-from-switching property [16].69
C D
C b− c −c
D b 0
Table 2. The payoff matrix for an additive prisoner’s dilemma game.
70
In the absence of structure, cooperators dwindle and disappear in the prisoner’s dilemma. In contrast,71
structured populations enable cooperators to form clusters, which ensures that cooperators more frequently72
interact with other cooperators than they would with random interactions [17,18]. Such assortment between73
cooperators is essential for the survival of cooperation [19].74
In heterogeneous graphs not all vertices have the same number of connections and hence the fitnesses75
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of individuals may be based on different numbers of interactions. Because of this, some vertices are more76
advantageous to occupy than others. However, which sites are favourable depends on the type of population77
dynamics. In particular, for the Moran process in structured populations it is important to distinguish78
between birth-death and death-birth updating [10, 20, 21], i.e. whether first an individual is randomly79
selected for reproduction with a probability proportional to its fitness and then the clonal offspring replaces80
a (uniformly) randomly selected neighbour – or, if first an individual is selected at random to die and then81
the vacant site is repopulated with the offspring of a neighbouring individual with a probability proportional82
to its fitness. Even in homogenous populations the sequence of events is of crucial importance but becomes83
even more pronounced in heterogenous structures [10,20].84
In order to illustrate that the population dynamics may bestow an advantage to individuals occupying85
certain sites in a heterogeneous population, consider neutral evolution, where game payoffs do not affect the86
evolutionary process and all individuals have the same fitness. For birth-death updating every individual87
is chosen to reproduce with the same probability but neighbours of individuals with few connections are88
replaced more frequently. Hence vertices with fewer neighbours are more favourable than those with many89
connections. Conversely, for death-birth updating every individual has the same expected life time but90
highly-connected individuals, or, hubs, get more frequently a chance to produce offspring, since one of their91
many neighbours dies, and are thus more favourable than vertices with few neighbours [21–23]. A simple92
example of this is a 3-line graph, one central vertex connected to two end vertices. In the birth-death process,93
the central vertex is replaced with probability 2/3, while either end vertex is replaced with probability 1/6,94
while in the death-birth process, the central vertex replaces either end vertex with probability 2/3 and either95
end replaces the centre with probability 1/6 [21]. The upshot is, even though the fitness of all individuals96
is the same, the effective number of offspring produced depends on the dynamics as well as an individual’s97
location in the population.98
The intrinsic advantage of some vertices over others can be further enhanced through game interactions99
leading to differences in fitness that depend on an individual’s strategy as well as its position on the graph.100
For example, a cooperator occupying a favourable vertex can more easily establish a cluster of cooperators,101
which creates a positive feedback through mutual increases in fitness. Conversely, a favourable vertex also102
supports the formation of a cluster of defectors but this results in a negative feedback and lowers the fitness of103
the defector in the favourable vertex. The fact that heterogeneity can promote cooperation was first observed104
for the prisoner’s dilemma and snowdrift games [24,25] and has subsequently been confirmed for public goods105
games [26, 27]. However, the detailed effects not only crucially depend on the dynamics but also on how106
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fitnesses are determined. For example, heterogenous population structures favour cooperation if payoffs from107
game interactions are accumulated but that advantage disappears if payoffs are averaged [28–30].108
The effects of population structure on the outcome of evolutionary games is sensitive to a number of109
factors: population dynamics [10, 20, 31], translation of payoffs into fitness [28, 30, 32–35] and the type of110
game played – for example, spatial structure tends to support cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma but111
conversely, in the snowdrift game, spatial structure may be detrimental [36]. Macroscopic features of the112
evolutionary process on the level of the population, such as frequency and distribution of cooperators, are113
determined by microscopic processes on the level of individuals. In the current article, we discuss some of114
these microscopic processes, such as averaging and accumulating payoffs, and the rate at which interactions115
take place, and illustrate how they affect an evolutionary outcome. We also develop a general framework to116
determine evolutionary advantage in finite, heterogeneous populations.117
The manuscript is organized as follows. Sections “Accumulated and Averaged Payoffs” and “Criteria for118
Evolutionary Success” largely review the literature concerning evolution on heterogeneous graphs, though119
we extend existing results to general 2 by 2 games and focus on an immitation process. Interspersed in120
these sections are new observations and results (eg. the criteria for evolutionary success section) that aid in121
establishing a consistent framework on which we base our main results presented in the section “Stochastic122
Interactions and Updates”.123
Results124
Accumulated versus Averaged Payoffs125
In heterogenous population structures individuals naturally engage in different numbers of interactions. This126
renders comparisons of the performances of individuals more challenging. One natural approach is to simply127
accumulate the game payoffs. This clearly puts hubs with many neighbours in a strong position as scoring128
many times even a small payoff may still exceed few large payoffs. To avoid this bias in favour of hubs, game129
payoffs can be averaged. Interestingly, these two approaches not only play a decisive role for the evolutionary130
outcome but also entail important biological implications.131
Consider two different ways to translate the total, accumulated payoffs pii of an individual i into its fitness132
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fi:133
fi = e
δpii , accumulated (1a)
fi = e
δ
pii
ni , averaged (1b)
where δ > 0 denotes the strength of selection and ni is the number of interactions experienced by i. The134
limit δ → 0 recovers the neutral process, where selection does not act. Note that the payoff matrix in Table135
1 can still be used without loss of generality because adding a constant κ merely changes the (arbitrary)136
baseline fitness from 1 to eδκ and multiplying the payoffs by λ is identical to simply changing the selection137
strength to δλ.138
The exponential form of fitness in the above equations is mathematically convenient since it guarantees139
that the fitness is always positive, irrespective of the strength of selection and payoff values. It is worth140
noting that if the strength of selection is weak, that is, δ  1, then141
fi = e
δpii ≈ 1 + δpii +O(δ), accumulated (2a)
fi = e
δ
pii
ni ≈ 1 + δ pii
ni
+O(δ), averaged (2b)
which represents another common form for fitness found in the literature [8].142
Homogenous populations143
In the past, details of the payoff accounting have received limited attention, or the two approaches have144
been used interchangeably, because they yield essentially the same results for traditional models of spatial145
games, which focus on lattice populations [4,37] or, more generally, on homogenous populations [8,10,38]. In146
fact, the difference in payoff accounting reduces to a change in the selection strength because in homogenous147
populations each individual has the same degree di = d (number of neighbours) and hence, on average, the148
same number of interactions n¯ per unit time. If each individual interacts with all its neighbours then n¯ = d.149
Thus, the only difference is that the selection strength for accumulated payoffs is n¯-times as strong as for150
averaged payoffs.151
Therefore, in homogenous populations all individuals engage in the same number of interactions per unit152
time and consequently accumulating or averaging payoffs merely affects the strength of selection. Naturally,153
the converse question arises – are uniform interaction rates restricted to homogenous graphs? Or, more154
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generally, which class of graphs supports uniform interaction rates?155
To answer this question, let us consider an arbitrary graph G with adjacency matrix W = [wij ] where156
wij ≥ 0 indicates the weight or the strength of the (directed) edge from vertex i to j. wij > 0 if vertex i is157
connected to j and wij = 0 if it is not. For example, the natural choice for the edge weights on undirected158
graphs is wij = 1/di. That is, all di edges leaving vertex i have the same weight and hence
∑N
j=1 wij = 1159
for all i.160
An individual on vertex i is selected to interact with vertex j with a probability proportional to wij .161
In this case we say vertex i has initiated the interaction. Interactions with self are excluded by requiring162
wii = 0. If there are M interactions per unit time, then the average number of interactions ni that vertex i163
engages in is given by164
ni = M
∑N
j=1 wij +
∑N
j=1 wji∑N
j,k=1 wjk
, (3)
where the fraction indicates the probability that vertex i participates in one particular interaction either by165
initiating it (first sum in numerator) or initiated by neighbours of i (second sum in numerator). On average166
each individual engages in 2M/N interactions. Note that the factor 2 enters because each interaction affects167
two individuals. Therefore, a graph structure results in uniform interaction rates if and only if168
∑N
j=1 (wij + wji)∑N
j,k=1 wjk
=
2
N
(4)
holds for every vertex i, or equivalently, if
∑N
j=1(wij + wji) = C0 for all i where C0 is an arbitrary positive169
constant.170
If the sum of the weights of all di edges leaving vertex i,
∑N
j=1 wij = C1 > 0, is the same for all i then171 ∑N
j,k=1 wkj = N ·C1 and Eq. (4) requires that the sum of the weights of all incoming edges,
∑N
j=1 wji = C1, for172
all i, as well to ensure uniform interaction rates. The class of graphs that satisfies the condition
∑N
j=1 wij =173 ∑N
j=1 wji = C1 for all i are called circulations [5] and, in the special case with C1 = 1, the adjacency matrix174
W is doubly stochastic such that each row and column sums to 1. A more generic representative of the175
broad class of circulation graphs is shown in Fig. 1 but this does not include heterogenous graphs such as176
scale-free networks.177
In order to illustrate that the number of interactions experienced by an individual depends on which178
vertex they reside, consider an arbitrary, random, undirected graph and assume that the degrees of adjacent179
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vertices are uncorrelated. Under this assumption the approximate probability that vertices i and j are180
connected by an edge is181
wij =
di dj
d¯ N
, (5)
where d¯ =
∑N
i=1 di/N is the average vertex degree. Inserting into Eq. (4) yields182
ni = M
2
N
di
d¯
. (6)
Hence, the number of interactions of one vertex scales linearly with its degree.183
Similarly, each vertex can initiate the same number of interactions, m. Then, with probability wji/dj184
the neighbouring vertex j initiates an interaction with i:185
ni = m
1 + N∑
j=1
wji
dj
 = m
1 + N∑
j=1
j 6=i
1
dj
di dj
d¯ N
 = m(1 + N − 1
N
di
d¯
)
. (7)
Again, vertices with a degree greater (less) than the average degree are expected to have more (fewer)186
interactions than on average. Interaction rates on various heterogenous networks are shown in Fig. 2.187
This indicates that on undirected graphs uniform interaction rates can be achieved only on regular graphs,188
where all vertices have the same number of neighbours.189
Heterogenous populations190
In recent years the focus has shifted from homogenous populations to heterogenous structures and, in par-191
ticular, to small-world or scale-free networks because they capture intriguing features of social networks [39].192
On these structures the accounting of payoffs becomes important and, indeed, a crucial determinant of the193
evolutionary outcome. If payoffs are accumulated, heterogenous structures further promote the evolution194
of cooperation [24, 25, 27, 40]. In contrast, averaging the game payoffs can remove the ability for scale-free195
graphs to sustain higher levels of cooperation [28–30].196
So far our discussion has focussed on interactions between individuals and the translation of payoffs into197
fitness. The next step is to specify how differences in fitness affect the population dynamics. The most198
common updating rules in evolutionary games on graphs fall into three categories: Moran birth-death and199
death-birth, and imitation processes. The evolutionary outcome can be highly sensitive to the choice of200
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update rule. For example, supposing weak selection, cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma may only thrive201
under death-birth but not under birth-death updating [8, 10,20].202
In heterogenous populations the range of payoffs depends on the payoff accounting: if payoffs are averaged,203
the range is determined by the maximum and minimum values in the payoff matrix but if payoffs are204
accumulated the range additionally depends on the size and structure of the population. In particular, this205
difference may also affect the updating rule: for example, the pairwise comparison process 1/2 + (fj − fi)/α206
represents the probability that vertex i adopts the strategy of vertex j based on their fitnesses of fi, fj ,207
respectively [41,42]. This represents an imitation process where α denotes a sufficiently large normalization208
constant to ensure that the expression indeed remains a probability. Since α needs to be at least twice the209
range of possible fitness values, a generic choice of α becomes impossible for accumulated payoffs.210
Here we focus on a related imitation process where an individual i is chosen at random to reassess its211
strategy by comparing its performance to a randomly chosen neighbour j. Individual i then imitates the212
strategy of j with probability213
1
2
+
1
2
fj − fi
fj + fi
, (8)
where fj and fi are the fitnesses of i and j. This variant is convenient as it includes an appropriate214
normalization factor and hence works regardless of how the fitnesses are calculated. In particular, for215
exponential payoff-to-fitness mapping (see Eq. (1)) the imitation rule, Eq. (8), recovers the Fermi-update [43]:216
217
1
1 + e−δ(pij−pii)
, accumulated (9a)
1
1 + e
−δ
(
pij
nj
− piini
) , averaged (9b)
For a comparison between averaged and accumulated payoffs in homogenous and heterogenous populations,218
see Fig. 3.219
On a microscopic level averaging or accumulating payoffs in heterogenous populations turns out to have220
important biological implications: when averaging payoffs, individuals play different games depending on221
their location on the graph, whereas for accumulated payoffs everyone plays the same game but at different222
rates – again based on the individuals’ locations. These intriguing differences are illustrated and discussed223
for the simplest heterogenous structure, the star graph. First we develop a framework that aids in analyzing224
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an evolutionary process in heterogeneous, graph-structured populations.225
Criteria for Evolutionary Success226
In order to determine the evolutionary success of a strategic type in a finite population we consider three227
fixation probabilities: ρA, ρB and ρ0. The first, ρA, indicates the probability that a single A type in an228
otherwise B population goes on to supplant all Bs, while the second, ρB , refers to the probability of the229
converse process where a single B type takes over a population of A types. These fixation probabilities230
are important whenever mutations can arise in the population during reproduction or through errors in231
imitating the strategies of others. The last probability, ρ0, denotes the fixation probability of the neutral232
process, which is defined as the dynamic in a population with vanishing selection, δ = 0. In such a case the233
game payoffs do not matter and everyone has the same fitness. Based on these fixation probabilities two234
distinct and complementary criteria are traditionally used to measure evolutionary success [15,20]:235
(i) Type A is said to have an evolutionary advantage or is favoured if236
ρA > ρB (10)
holds. If mutations, or errors in imitation, are rare the mutant has disappeared or taken over the237
entire population before the next mutation occurs. We can then view the population dynamic as an238
embedded Markov chain transitioning between two states: all-A and all-B. Denote the proportion of239
time spent in the state all-A (respectively, all-B) by TA (resp. TB). Together, TA and TB are known240
as the stationary distribution of the Markov chain and satisfy the balance equation241
TBµAρA = TAµBρB , (11)
where µA (µB) is the probability an A (B) appears in the all-B (all-A) population. For homogeneous242
populations, or if mutations are not tied to reproduction or imitation events, µA = µB and so Eq. (11)243
reads244
TBρA = TAρB . (12)
Hence, if ρA > ρB then TA > TB , which captures the notion of A having an advantage over B. If the245
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inequality, Eq. (10), is reversed then type B has the advantage.246
(ii) Type A is a beneficial mutation if247
ρA > ρ0 (13a)
holds. Similarly, if248
ρB > ρ0 (13b)
holds, the B type is a beneficial mutation. Note that, in general, Eqs. (13a) and (13b) are not mutually249
exclusive. A and B types may simultaneously be advantageous mutants – in co-existence games, S >250
0, T > 1, such as the snowdrift game – or both disadvantageous – in coordination games, S < 0, T < 1,251
such as the stag-hunt game.However, for payoff matrices that satisfy equal-gains-from-switching, such as252
Table 2, ρA > ρ0 implies ρB < ρ0 and vice versa in unstructured populations or for weak selection [44].253
The above conditions (12) and (15) are based on the implicit assumption of homogenous populations or254
averaged payoffs and randomly placed mutants. In the present context of heterogenous populations and255
with mutants explicitly arising through errors in reproduction or imitation, both conditions require further256
scrutiny and appropriate adjustments.257
The first condition implicitly assumes that an A mutant appears in a monomorphic B population with258
the same probability as a B mutant in a monomorphic A population. However, in heterogenous populations259
with accumulated payoffs this is not necessarily the case because even in monomorphic states hubs may260
have a higher fitness and hence are more readily imitated, or reproduce more frequently, than low degree261
vertices. This can result in a bias of the rates µA, µB at which A and B mutants arise. Thus, the condition262
for evolutionary advantage, Eq. (10), must read263
µAρA > µBρB . (14)
In general, µA and µB depend on the population structure as well as the payoffs and their accounting. The264
star structure serves as an illustrative example in the next section.265
Similarly, the second condition also needs to be made more explicit. In general, to determine whether266
a mutation is beneficial its fixation probability should exceed the probability that in the corresponding267
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monomorphic population one particular individual eventually establishes as the common ancestor of the268
entire population. We denote these monomorphic fixation probabilities by ρAA, and ρBB , respectively.269
Thus, the second condition, Eq. (13), should be interpreted as270
ρA > ρBB (15a)
ρB > ρAA, (15b)
i.e. that the fixation probability of a single A (or B) mutant in a B (A) population exceeds that of one B271
(A) individual turning into the common ancestor of the entire population.272
If mutations occur during an updating event, then in heterogeneous populations mutants occur more273
frequently in some vertices than in others. For our imitation process, high degree vertices serve more often274
as models than low degree vertices and hence the mutation is likely to occur in neighbours of high degree275
vertices. Note that this is different from placing a mutant on a vertex chosen uniformly at random from all276
vertices [45]. A randomly placed neutral mutant fixates, on average, with a probability corresponding to277
the inverse of the population size. This is not necessarily the case if neutral mutants arise in reproductive278
events or errors in imitating or adopting other strategies. In fact, the distinction between ρ0, ρAA and ρBB279
is only required on heterogenous graphs with accumulated payoffs and non-random locations of mutants. In280
all other situations the (average) monomorphic fixation probabilities are the same and equal to ρ0 = 1/N ,281
where N is the population size.282
In summary, due to the fitness differences in a monomorphic A population with accumulated payoffs283
the turnover is accelerated and more strategy updates take place and hence more errors occur than in the284
corresponding monomorphic B population. This means that, on average, mutant Bs more frequently attempt285
to invade an A population than vice versa.286
The Star Graph287
The star graph represents the simplest, highly heterogenous structure. A star graph of size N + 1 consist of288
a central vertex, the hub, which is connected to all N leaf vertices. On the star graph the range of degrees289
is maximal – the hub has degree N and all leaves have degree one.290
In order to illustrate the differences arising from accumulating and averaging payoffs, consider a situation291
where each individual initiated, on average, one interaction. Thus, the hub has N + 1 interactions while292
the leaves have only 1 + 1/N . Assume that i vertices are of type A and N − i of type B. The payoff to a293
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hub of type A is then (i+ (N − i)S)(1 + 1/N) for accumulated payoffs and (i+ (N − i)S)/N if payoffs are294
averaged. In contrast, the payoff of an A leaf is 1 + 1/N (accumulated) and 1 (averaged). From each A leaf295
the hub gains 1 + 1/N for accumulated payoffs, which is the same as the gain for the A leaf. However, for296
averaged payoffs, the hub only gains 1/N from each A leaf but each A leaf still gains 1 from the interaction297
with the hub. Thus, A-A-interactions are more profitable for vertices with a low degree and the payoff gets298
discounted for vertices with larger degrees. Although potential losses against B leaves also get discounted:299
T for B leaves versus S/N for an A hub for averaged payoffs as opposed to T (1 + 1/N) for B leaves versus300
S(1 + 1/N) for an A hub for accumulated payoffs. For A types it is less attractive to interact with B types301
whenever S < 1 and hence applies to all generalized social dilemmas [12].302
Similarly, the payoffs to a type B hub are i T (1 + 1/N) (accumulated) and i T/N (averaged) versus 0303
for B leaves (accumulated and averaged) or S(1 + 1/N) (accumulated) and S (averaged) for A leaves. In304
B-B-interactions both players get zero, regardless of the aggregation of payoffs, which is a consequence of305
our particular scaling of the payoff matrix in Table 1. Hence there is no discrimination between vertices of306
different degrees. An illustration of the differences arising from payoff accounting for the simpler and more307
intuitive case of the prisoner’s dilemma in terms of costs and benefits (see Table 2), is given in Fig. 4.308
In particular, on star graphs or, more generally, on scale-free networks, averaged payoffs result in higher309
and hence less favourable cost-to-benefit ratios for most individuals in the population, those with the lower310
degree vertices. Naturally these differences are also reflected in the evolutionary dynamics. We demonstrate311
this through the fixation probabilities of a single A (B) type in a population of B (A) types.312
Let us first consider the fixation probability of a single A type, ρA. Because of the heterogenous population313
structure, ρA depends on the location of the initial A – for a star graph, whether the A originated in the314
hub or one of the leaves. We denote the two fixation probabilities by ρA|H and ρA|L, respectively. With315
probability N/(N + 1) one of the leaves is chosen to update its strategy and the hub with probability316
1/(N + 1). For averaged payoffs the fitnesses of everyone is the same in a monomorphic B population and317
hence the hub is equally likely to adopt the strategy of a leaf, and make a mistake with probability µ 1,318
as are leaves that are adopting the hubs strategy. Hence the average fixation probability is given by319
ρ¯A =
N
N + 1
ρA|L +
1
N + 1
ρA|H . (16)
In contrast, for accumulated payoffs even in a homogenous population the hub does not necessarily have the320
same payoffs as the leaves because of the larger number of interactions. However, for our payoff matrix in321
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Table 1, this does not matter for homogenous B populations as all B-B-interactions yield a payoff of zero.322
Consequently, Eq. (16) equally holds for averaged and accumulated payoffs and, incidentally, this is also the323
average fixation probability for a randomly placed A mutant.324
Similarly, we are interested in the average fixation probability, ρ¯B , of a single B type in an otherwise325
homogenous A population. Again we first need to determine with what probability the B mutant arises in326
a leaf or in the hub. Interestingly, and in contrast to ρ¯A, this now depends on the accounting of payoffs. If327
payoffs are averaged then all individuals have the same payoff and, in analogy to Eq. (16), we obtain328
ρ¯ avgB =
N
N + 1
ρB|L +
1
N + 1
ρB|H . (17)
However, for accumulated payoffs, the hub achieves a payoff of N + 1 as compared to an average payoff of329
merely 1 + 1/N for the leaves. In order to determine the average fixation probability of a single B type,330
ρ¯ accuB , we first consider the case where the mutant arises on a leaf. With probability N/(N + 1) a leaf is331
selected to update its strategy and adopts the hub’s strategy with probability 1/(1 + exp(−δ(N − 1/N)))332
(c.f. Eq. (9a)). If the leaf adopts the strategy it makes an error with a small probability and instead of333
copying the A strategy, the leaf becomes of type B. Similarly, the hub reassesses its strategy with probability334
1/(N + 1) and switches to the leafs strategy with probability 1/(1 + exp(δ(N − 1/N))), which may then give335
rise to an A type in the hub with a small probability. Based on these probabilities we can now determine336
the proportion of mutants that occur in the leaves and the hub, respectively. For the leaves we get337
N
N+1
1
1+e
−δ(N− 1N )
N
N+1
1
1+e
−δ(N− 1N )
+ 1N+1
1
1+e
δ(N− 1N )
=
N
N + e−δ(N−
1
N )
and similarly for the hub338
1
N+1
1
1+e
δ(N− 1N )
N
N+1
1
1+e
−δ(N− 1N )
+ 1N+1
1
1+e
δ(N− 1N )
=
1
1 +N eδ(N−
1
N )
.
Thus, the average fixation probability of a single B mutant is339
ρ¯ accuB =
N
N + e−δ(N−
1
N )
ρB|L +
1
1 +Neδ(N−
1
N )
ρB|H . (18)
In the weak selection limit, δ  1 (or, more precisely, δN  1), Eq. (18) takes on the same form as for340
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averaged payoffs, Eq. (17). Conversely, for large populations, δN  1, mutants almost surely arise in leaves341
and hence ρ¯ accuB ≈ ρB|L. Note that this is a good approximation as for N = 100 and δ = 0.1 the probability342
that the mutant arises in the hub is already less than 10−6.343
In order to determine the evolutionary advantage of A and B types we still need to determine the rates344
µA, µB at which A and B mutants arise in monomorphic B and A populations, respectively. If payoffs are345
averaged all individuals in the population have the same fitness and hence with probability 1/2 the focal346
individual imitates its neighbour (c.f. Eq. (9a)) and with a small probability µ an error (or mutation) occurs.347
This holds for monomorphic populations of either type and hence µA = µB . For accumulated payoffs the348
same argument holds for monomorphic B populations where all individuals have zero payoff. Consequently,349
A mutants arise at a rate µA = 1/2µ. In contrast, in a monomorphic A population the hub has a much350
higher fitness and leaves will almost surely imitate the hub (whereas the hub almost surely will not imitate351
a leaf):352
µB =
(
N
N + 1
1
1 + e−δ(N−
1
N )
+
1
N + 1
1
1 + eδ(N−
1
N )
)
µ. (19)
For large N every update essentially results in one of the leaves imitating the hub, so that µB ≈ µ.353
Equations (16) through (18) yield the conditions under which type A or B has an evolutionary advantage.354
For star graphs, the fixation probabilities, ρA and ρB , can be derived based on the transition probabilities355
to increase or decrease the number of mutants by one and hence the results can be easily applied to any356
update rule [45]. For the imitation dynamics A types are favoured under weak selection if and only if357
ρ¯ avgA > ρ¯
avg
B ⇐⇒
N − 1
2N
> T − S averaged (20a)
µAρ¯
accu
A > µB ρ¯
accu
B ⇐⇒
2N(N + 1)
N2 + 4N − 1 > T − S accumulated (20b)
and in the limit of infinite populations, N →∞, the conditions reduce to358
ρ¯ avgA > ρ¯
avg
B ⇐⇒
1
2
> T − S averaged (20c)
µAρ¯
accu
A > µB ρ¯
accu
B ⇐⇒ 2 > T − S accumulated (20d)
A detailed derivation of the different fixation probabilities is provided in the Materials and Methods section.359
In order to determine whether a mutant is favoured or not (see Eq. (15)), we first need to determine360
the fixation probabilities ρAA and ρBB . Naturally, those fixation probabilities again depend on whether the361
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ancestor is located in the hub or one of the leaves. Let us first consider a monomorphic B population. The362
fixation probability of a B located in the hub, ρBB|H , or in one particular leaf, ρBB|L, can be derived from363
the fixation probabilities ρB|H and ρB|L by setting fi = 1 (see Materials and Methods), which yields364
ρBB|H =
1
2
(21a)
ρBB|L =
1
2N
. (21b)
Intuitively, the hub individual becomes the common ancestor with probability 1/2 because any leaf individual365
updates its strategy to the hub’s with a probability of 1/2 and the hub keeps its strategy also with probability366
of 1/2 but both probabilities are independent of the size of the population. Conversely, a leaf individual367
must first be imitated by the hub, which is 1/N times less likely than the reverse. On average we then obtain368
(insert into Eq. (16)):369
ρ¯BB =
1
N + 1
. (22)
Note that in a monomorphic B population the payoffs are zero regardless of the selection strength, δ, location370
(hub and leaves) or the payoff accounting. Again, this is a consequence of our particular choice of payoff371
matrix (Table 1), and thus, Eq. (22) holds for both averaged as well as accumulated payoffs and is, in fact,372
the same as the neutral fixation probability ρ0.373
Let us now turn to the monomorphic A population and determine ρAA. If δ = 0 then everything is the374
same as in the monomorphic B population above and ρ¯AA = 1/(N+1). However, for any non-zero selection,375
δ > 0, the situation becomes more interesting. If payoffs are averaged, all individuals have the same (non-376
zero) payoffs and a mutant is equally likely to appear in the hub as any particular leaf (c.f. Eq. (17)) and377
hence ρ¯AA = 1/(N + 1) still holds. However, if payoffs are accumulated the hub has a higher fitness. The378
fixation probabilities that an A on the hub or one of the leaves becomes the common ancestor are ρAA|H379
and ρAA|L (see Materials and Methods) and, on average we obtain380
ρ¯ accuAA =
1
N + 1
− 1
2
(
N − 1
N + 1
)2
δ +O
(
δ2
)
. (23)
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Now we are able to derive the conditions under which an A and/or B mutant is beneficial, c.f. Eq. (15):381
ρ¯ avgA > ρ¯
avg
BB ⇐⇒ (4N2 − 3N − 1) + (14N2 − 3N + 1)S > (10N2 + 3N − 1)T (24a)
ρ¯ avgB > ρ¯
avg
AA ⇐⇒ (8N2 − 9N + 1) + (10N2 + 3N − 1)S < (14N2 − 3N + 1)T (24b)
for averaged payoffs and, for accumulated payoffs,382
ρ¯ accuA > ρ¯
accu
BB ⇐⇒ (4N2 − 3N − 1) + (5N2 + 9N − 2)S > (N2 + 15N − 4)T (24c)
ρ¯ accuB > ρ¯
accu
AA ⇐⇒ (8N2 − 9N + 1) + (N2 + 15N − 4)S < (5N2 + 9N − 2)T. (24d)
The parameter region which delimits the region of evolutionary success of A and B types is illustrated in383
Fig. 5.384
We can analyze Eqs. (20a) - (20d) and (24a) - (24d) in terms of the additive prisoner’s dilemma game385
by substituting S = −c/(b− c) and T = b/(b− c). For simplicity, we restrict attention to the case N →∞386
and since in the additive prisoner’s dilemma game a strategy is favoured if and only if it beneficial we need387
only consider Eqs. (20a) - (20d). We have388
ρ¯ avgA > ρ¯
avg
B ⇐⇒
b
c
< −3 averaged (25a)
µAρ¯
accu
A > µB ρ¯
accu
B ⇐⇒
b
c
> 3 accumulated (25b)
If we suppose b, c > 0, then Eq. (25a) is never satisfied. That is, averaging rather than accumulating the389
payoffs altogether removes the ability of the star graph to support cooperation.390
Note that for additive, or equal-gains-from-switching, games (games that satisfy S+T = 1) and for weak391
selection the condition ρA > ρBB implies both ρB < ρAA and ρBB = ρAA = 1/(N + 1), regardless of the392
accounting of payoffs. This extends results obtained for homogenous populations [8, 10].393
Stochastic Interactions & Updates394
As we have seen, when payoffs are averaged, members of a heterogeneous population are possibly playing395
different games, while if they are accumulated, all individuals play the same game. Therefore, only ac-396
cumulating payoffs allows for meaningful comparissons of different heterogeneous population structures. A397
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common simplifying assumption is that each individuals interacts once with all its neighbours, see Fig. 3. For398
heterogeneous populations this assumption means that those individuals residing on higher-degree vertices399
are interacting with their neighbours at a higher rate than those on lower-degree vertices. This leads to a400
separation of time scales, where interactions occur on a much faster time scale than strategy updates.401
Realistically, all social interactions require a finite amount of time and hence the number of interactions402
per unit time is limited. This constraint already affects the evolutionary process in unstructured populations403
[46] but becomes particularly important in heterogenous networks where, for example, in scale-free networks404
some vertices entertain neighbourhood sizes that are orders of magnitude larger than that of other vertices.405
For those hubs it may not be possible to engage in interactions with all neighbours between subsequent406
updates of their strategy or the strategies of one of their neighbours. In order to investigate this we need to407
abandon the separation of the timescales for interactions and strategy updates.408
A unified time scale on which interactions and strategy updates occur can be introduced as a stochastic409
process where a randomly chosen individual i initiates an interaction with probability ω with a random410
neighbour j and reassesses its strategy with probability 1 − ω by comparing its payoff to that of a random411
neighbour according to Eq. (8). Interactions alter the payoffs pii, pij of both individuals (and hence their412
fitnesses, fi, fj , see Eq. (1a)) according to the game matrix in Table 1. If individual i adopts the strategy413
of its neighbour, then its payoff (and interaction count) is reset to zero, pii = 0, regardless of whether the414
imitation had resulted in an actual change of strategy. Simulation results for various ω are shown in Fig. 6.415
For small ω  1 few interactions occur between strategy updates and in the limit ω → 0 neutral416
evolution is recovered because no interactions occur. Conversely, in the limit ω → 1 many interactions417
occur between strategy updates, which allows individuals to garner large payoffs as well as build up large418
payoff differences. The average number of interactions initiated by any individual between subsequent419
reassessments of the strategy is ω/(1 − ω), the relative ratio of the time scales of game interactions versus420
strategy updates. However, the distribution of the number of interactions is biased: individuals with a large421
number of interactions tend to score high payoffs and hence are less likely to imitate a neighbours’ strategy,422
which in turn results in a further increase of interactions. On heterogenous graphs and scale-free networks,423
in particular, this bias is built-in by the underlying structure because highly connected hubs engage, on424
average, in a much larger number of interactions than vertices with few neighbours. Moreover, hubs are425
more likely to serve as models when neighbours are reassessing their strategy – simply because hubs have426
many neighbours. Thus, hubs are not only more resilient to change but also have a stronger influence on427
their neighbourhood. When ω/(1−ω) this ratio begins to get large, interactions dominate strategy updates428
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and the resulting game dynamics on heterogeneous and homogeneous graphs becomes indistinguishable.429
Interestingly, a similar bias in interaction numbers spontaneously emerges on homogenous graphs, lattices430
in particular. Since all vertices have the same number of neighbours, no vertices are predisposed to achieve431
more interactions than others but some inequalities in interaction numbers occur simply based on stochastic432
fluctuations. As above, those vertices that happen to engage in more interactions tend to have higher payoffs433
and hence are less likely to imitate their neighbours and keep aggregating payoffs. This positive feedback434
between interaction count and resilience to change spontaneously introduces another form of heterogeneity,435
which becomes increasingly pronounced for larger ω. In fact, for large ω it rivals the structurally imposed436
heterogeneity of scale-free networks, see Fig. 7.437
Regardless of the structure, the positive feedback between payoff aggregation and the diminishing chances438
to change strategy (and hence reset payoffs) means that a small set of nodes forms an almost static backdrop439
of the dynamics and hence has a considerable effect on the evolutionary process. This set is a random440
selection on homogenous structures and consists of the hubs on heterogenous structures. As a consequence,441
the initial configuration of the population has long lasting effects on the abundance of strategies.442
A more detailed view on the effects of ω on the evolutionary process is provided by restricting the443
attention to the prisoner’s dilemma and additive payoffs, c.f. Table 2. This can be accomplished by setting444
T = 1−S with S < 0. The equilibrium levels of cooperation in the Sω-plane are shown in Fig. 8 for lattices445
and scale-free networks.446
Altering the relative rates of interactions versus strategy updates has interesting effects on the evolution-447
ary outcome. For lower rates of interaction (ω  1), scale-free networks outperform lattices in their ability448
to promote cooperation. As interaction rates increase and strategy updates become more rare (ω ≈ 1),449
scale-free networks and lattices become virtiually indistinguishable in their ability to support cooperation.450
For both lattices and scale-free networks an optimal ratio between strategy updates and interactions exist:451
for lattices this is roughly ω = 1/2, suggesting that lattices support the greatest amount of cooperators when452
interactions occur at the same rate as strategy updates, whereas for scale-free networks the optimum lies453
around ω ≈ 0.25, which suggests that scale-free networks provide the strongest support for cooperation if454
there are roughly three updates per interaction.455
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Discussion456
Evolutionary dynamics in heterogenous populations, scale-free networks in particular, have attracted con-457
siderable attention over recent years. Somewhat surprisingly, the underlying microscopic processes and their458
implications for the macroscopic dynamics and the corresponding biological interpretations have received459
little attention.460
Here we have shown that established criteria to measure success in evolutionary processes make different461
kinds of implicit assumptions that do not hold in general for heterogenous structures. Instead, for such462
structures it becomes imperative to reconsider, revise and generalize these criteria, which was done in the463
Criteria for Evolutionary Success section. If errors arise in imitating the strategic type of other individuals,464
or mutations occur during reproduction, then mutations are more likely to arise in some locations than in465
others. For example, on the star graph mutants likely occur in the leaf nodes for birth-death updating466
and imitation processes but in the hub for death-birth processes. Moreover, in heterogenous populations467
the fixation probabilities generally depend on the initial location of the mutant and hence even the fixation468
probability of a neutral mutant may no longer simply be the reciprocal of the population size but rather469
intricately depend on the population structure.470
Another crucial determinant of the evolutionary dynamics in heterogenous populations is the aggregation471
of payoffs from interactions between individuals. Individuals on vertices with a higher (lower) degree expect472
to have more (fewer) interactions than on average. Even though the choice between averaging or accumulating473
payoffs may seem innocuous, it has far reaching consequences. If payoffs are accumulated, some individuals474
are capable of accruing more payoffs than others strictly by virtue of them having more potential partners.475
Averaging payoffs removes the ability of hubs to accrue greater payoffs, but simultaneously makes it difficult476
to compare results for different population structures (e.g. lattices versus scale-free networks) even if their477
average degrees are the same because the type of game played depends on the location in the graph. Hence,478
accumulating payoffs seems a more natural choice to compare evolutionary outcomes based on different479
population structures because it ensures that everyone engages in the same game. However, if we assume all480
interactions are realised then those individuals with more neighbours interact at a much greater rate than481
those with less.482
In order to investigate the disparity in the number of interactions on the success of strategies on heteroge-483
nous graphs we introduced the time-scale parameter ω, which determines the probability that an interaction484
or a strategy update occurs. When increasing the rate of strategy updates (small ω), heterogeneous graphs485
are able to support higher levels of cooperation than lattices. Conversely, increasing the rate of interactions486
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(large ω) results in small differences between lattices and scale-free networks; both support roughly the same487
levels of cooperation. For imitation processes, individuals with high payoffs are unlikely to change their488
strategies and hence are likely to keep accumulating more payoffs. On scale-free networks, hubs are predes-489
tined to become such high performing individuals but on lattices they spontaneously emerge, triggered by490
stochastic fluctuation in the interaction count and driven by the positive feedback between increasing payoffs491
and increasing resilience to changing strategies (and hence to resetting payoffs).492
For intermediate ω an optimum increase in the level of cooperation is found: lattices support cooperation493
most efficiently if a balance is struck between interactions and strategy updates (ω ≈ 0.5), whereas scale-free494
networks work most efficiently if slightly more updates occur (ω ≈ 0.25). For lattices a related observation495
was reported for noise in the updating process [47]. If the noise is large, updating is random but if it is496
small the game payoffs become essential. Interestingly, cooperation is most abundant for intermediate levels497
of noise – which is similar to having some but not too many interactions between strategy updates.498
Previous work has found that heterogeneous graphs support coordination of strategies, where all indi-499
viduals are inclined to adopt the same strategy, while homogeneous graphs support co-existence [48, 49].500
The time scale parameter ω introduced in the Stochastic Interactions and Updates section seems to aid501
in promoting coexistence in both types of graphs, based on the large green region in Figures 3, 6, and 8.502
Exactly how the time scale parameter ω promotes coexistence is a topic worthy of further investigation.503
Naturally there is no correct way of modelling the updating of the population or the aggregation of payoffs504
but, as so often, the devil is in the detail and implicit assumptions originating in traditional, homogenous505
models may be misleading or have unexpected consequences in more general, heterogenous populations.506
Materials and Methods507
In [45], the authors calculate expressions for the probability that a single mutant fixes on a star graph. These508
expressions are in terms of state transition probabilities. Denote by PXYi,j the transition probability from a509
state with i A individuals on the leaves and an X individual on the hub to a state with j A individuals on510
the leaves and a Y on the hub. With this notation, the fixation probability of a single A on a leaf vertex is511
ρA|L =
PAA0,1
PAA0,1 + P
AB
1,1
1
A(1, N)
, (26)
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and for a single A on the hub,512
ρA|H =
PBA1,1
PBA1,1 + P
BB
1,0
1
A(1, N)
, (27)
where, in both cases,513
A(1, N) = 1 +
N−1∑
j=1
PABj,j
PABj,j + P
AA
j,j+1
j∏
k=1
PBBk,k−1
(
PAAk,k+1 + P
AB
k,k
)
PAAk,k+1
(
PBBk,k−1 + P
BA
k,k
) . (28)
For the imitation process defined by Eq. 8 and accumulated payoffs we have514
PAAi,i+1 =
N − i
N + 1
eδ(i+(N−i)S)(1+1/N)
eδ(i+(N−i)S)(1+1/N) + eδT (1+1/N)
(29a)
PABi,i =
1
N + 1
N − i
N
eδT (1+1/N)
eδ(i+(N−i)S)(1+1/N) + eδT (1+1/N)
(29b)
PBAi,i =
1
N + 1
i
N
eδS(1+1/N)
eδiT (1+1/N) + eδS(1+1/N)
(29c)
PBBi,i−1 =
i
N + 1
eδiT (1+1/N)
eδiT (1+1/N) + eδS(1+1/N)
(29d)
and for averaged payoffs,515
PAAi,i+1 =
N − i
N + 1
eδ((i+(N−i)S)/N)
eδ((i+(N−i)S)/N) + eδT
(30a)
PABi,i =
1
N + 1
N − i
N
eδT
eδ((i+(N−i)S)/N) + eδT
(30b)
PBAi,i =
1
N + 1
i
N
eδS
eδ(i/N)T + eδS
(30c)
PBBi,i−1 =
i
N + 1
eδ(i/N)T
eδ(i/N)T + eδS
. (30d)
These are incorporated into the Eqs. (26) and (27) to yield the fixation probabilities ρA|L and ρA|H . The516
fixation probabilities ρB|L and ρB|H are obtained in a similar way. The averages ρaccuA,B and ρ
avg
A,B are then517
calculated using Eqs. (16), (17), and (18). Finally, a first-order approximation in δ is found for the above.518
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For example,519
ρaccuA =
[
1
N + 1
ρA|H +
N
N + 1
ρA|L
]
δ=0
+
d
dδ
[
1
N + 1
ρA|H +
N
N + 1
ρA|L
]
δ=0
δ +O(δ2)
=
1
N + 1
+
((
1
N + 1
)
d
dδ
ρA|H
∣∣∣∣
δ=0
+
(
N
N + 1
)
d
dδ
ρA|L
∣∣∣∣
δ=0
)
δ +O(δ2)
=
1
N + 1
+
δ
12N(N + 1)
((
5N2 + 9N − 2)S − (N2 + 15N − 4)T
+
(
4N2 − 3N − 1))+O(δ2) (31a)
The other fixation probabilities are found in a similar way:520
ρaccuB =
1
N + 1
− δ
12N(N + 1)2
((
N3 + 16N2 + 11N − 4)S − (5N3 + 14N2 + 7N − 2)T
+
(
14N3 − 13N2 − 2N + 1))+O(δ2) (31b)
ρavgA =
1
N + 1
+
δ
12N(N + 1)2
((
14N2 − 3N + 1)S − (10N2 + 3N − 1)T
+
(
4N2 − 3N − 1))+O(δ2) (31c)
ρavgB =
1
N + 1
− δ
12N(N + 1)2
((
10N2 + 3N − 1)S − (14N2 − 3N + 1)T
+
(
8N2 − 9N + 1))+O(δ2) (31d)
Assuming δ  1, and employing the appropriate condition for evolutionary advantage, yields Eqs. (24a–24d)521
in the main text.522
Acknowledgments523
References524
1. Wright S (1931) Evolution in Mendelian populations. Genetics 16: 97–159.525
2. Kimura M, Weiss G (1964) The stepping stone model of population structure and the decrease of526
genetic correlation with distance. Genetics 49: 561-575.527
3. Levins R (1969) Some demographic and genetic consequences of environmental heterogeneity for bio-528
logical control. Bulletin of the Entomological Society of America 15: 237-240.529
23
4. Nowak MA, May RM (1992) Evolutionary games and spatial chaos. Nature 359: 826-829.530
5. Lieberman E, Hauert C, Nowak MA (2005) Evolutionary dynamics on graphs. Nature 433: 312-316.531
6. Frucht R (1949) Graphs of degree three with a given abstract group. Canadian Journal of Mathematics532
1: 365-378.533
7. Ohtsuki H, Nowak MA (2006) Evolutionary games on cycles. Proceedings of the Royal Society B 273:534
2249–2256.535
8. Taylor PD, Day T, Wild G (2007) Evolution of cooperation in a finite homogeneous graph. Nature536
447: 469-472.537
9. Grafen A, Archetti M (2008) Natural selection of altruism in inelastic viscous homogeneous popula-538
tions. Journal of Theoretical Biology 252: 694–710.539
10. Ohtsuki H, Hauert C, Lieberman E, Nowak MA (2006) A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation540
on graphs. Nature 441: 502-505.541
11. Dawes RM (1980) Social dilemmas. Annual Review of Psychology 31: 169-193.542
12. Hauert C, Michor F, Nowak MA, Doebeli M (2006) Synergy and discounting of cooperation in social543
dilemmas. Journal of Theoretical Biology 239: 195-202.544
13. Taylor PD, Jonker L (1978) Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics. Mathematical Bio-545
sciences 40: 145-156.546
14. Hofbauer J, Sigmund K (1998) Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics. Cambridge University547
Press, Cambridge.548
15. Nowak MA, Sasaki A, Taylor C, Fudenberg D (2004) Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary549
stability in finite populations. Nature 428: 646-650.550
16. Nowak MA, Sigmund K (1990) The evolution of stochastic strategies in the prisoner’s dilemma. Acta551
Applicandae Mathematicae 20: 247-265.552
17. Van Baalen M, Rand DA (1998) The unit of selection in viscous populations and the evolution of553
altruism. Journal of Theoretical Biology 193: 631-648.554
24
18. Hauert C (2001) Fundamental clusters in spatial 2×2 games. Proceedings of the Royal Society B 268:555
761-9.556
19. Fletcher JA, Doebeli M (2009) A simple and general explanation for the evolution of altruism. Pro-557
ceedings of the Royal Society B 276: 13–19.558
20. Zukewich J, Kurella V, Doebeli M, Hauert C (2013) Consolidating birth-death and death-birth pro-559
cesses in structured populations. PLoS One 8: e54639.560
21. Maciejewski W (2014) Reproductive value in graph-structured populations. Journal of Theoretical561
Biology 340: 285-293.562
22. Broom M, Rychtar J, Stadler B (2011) Evolutionary dynamics on graphs - the effect of graph structure563
and initial placement on mutant spread. Journal of Statistical Theory and Practice 5: 369-381.564
23. Li C, Zhang B, Cressman R, Tao Y (2013) Evolution of cooperation in a heterogeneous graph: Fixation565
probabilities under weak selection. PLoS One 8.566
24. Santos FC, Pacheco JM (2005) Scale-free networks provide a unifying framework for the emergence of567
cooperation. Physical Review Letters 95: 098104.568
25. Santos FC, Rodrigues JF, Pacheco JM (2006) Graph topology plays a determinant role in the evolution569
of cooperation. Proceedings of the Royal Society B 273: 51-55.570
26. Santos FC, Pacheco JM, Lenaerts T (2006) Cooperation prevails when individuals adjust their social571
ties. PLoS Computational Biology 2: 1284-1291.572
27. Santos FC, Santos MD, Pacheco JM (2008) Social diversity promotes the emergence of cooperation in573
public goods games. Nature 454: 213–216.574
28. Tomassini M, Pestelacci E, Luthi L (2007) Social dilemmas and cooperation in complex networks.575
International Journal of Modern Physics C 18: 1173-1185.576
29. Szolnoki A, Perc M, Danku Z (2008) Towards effective payoffs in the prisoner’s dilemma game on577
scale-free networks. Physica A 387: 2075–2082.578
30. Antonioni A, Tomassini M (2012) Cooperation on social networks and its robustness. Advances in579
Complex Systems 15.580
25
31. Huberman BA, Glance NS (1993) Evolutionary games and computer simulations. Proceedings of the581
National Academy of Sciences USA 90: 7716-7718.582
32. Masuda N (2007) Participation costs dismiss the advantage of heterogeneous networks in evolution of583
cooperation. Proceedings of the Royal Society B 274: 1815–1821.584
33. Perc M, Szolnoki A (2008) Social diversity and promotion of cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s585
dilemma game. Physical Review E 77: 0011904.586
34. Pacheco J, Pinheiro FL, Santos FC (2009) Population structure induces a symmetry breaking favouring587
the emergence of cooperation. PLoS Computational Biology 5: e1000596.588
35. Grilo C, Correia L (2011) Effects of asynchronism on evolutionary games. Journal of Theoretical589
Biology 269: 109-122.590
36. Hauert C, Doebeli M (2004) Spatial structure often inhibits the evolution of cooperation in the snow-591
drift game. Nature 428: 643-646.592
37. Hauert C (2002) Effects of space in 2× 2 games. International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos 12:593
1531-1548.594
38. Szabo´ G, Fa´th G (2007) Evolutionary games on graphs. Physics Reports 446: 97-216.595
39. Baraba´si A, Albert R (1999) Emergence of scaling in random networks. Science 286: 509-512.596
40. Santos FC, Pinheiro FL, Lenaerts T, Pacheco JM (2012) The role of diversity in the evolution of597
cooperation. Journal of Theoretical Biology 299: 88-96.598
41. Traulsen A, Claussen JC, Hauert C (2005) Coevolutionary dynamics: From finite to infinite popula-599
tions. Physical Review Letters 95: 238701.600
42. Traulsen A, Claussen JC, Hauert C (2012) Stochastic differential equations for evolutionary dynamics601
with demographic noise and mutations. Physical Review E 85: 041901.602
43. Szabo´ G, To˝ke C (1998) Evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma game on a square lattice. Physical Review603
E 58: 69-73.604
44. Taylor PD, Day T, Wild G (2007) From inclusive fitness to fixation probability in homogeneous605
structured populations. Journal of Theoretical Biology 249: 101-110.606
26
45. Hadjichrysanthou C, Broom M, Rychta´rˇ J (2011) Evolutionary games on star graphs under various607
updating rules. Dynamic Games and Applications 1: 386-407.608
46. Woelfing B, Traulsen A (2009) Stochastic sampling of interaction partners versus deterministic payoff609
assignment. Journal of Theoretical Biology 257: 689–695.610
47. Szabo´ G, Vukov J, Szolnoki A (2005) Phase diagrams for an evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game on611
two-dimensional lattices. Physical Review E 72: 047107.612
48. Pinheiro F, Pacheco JM, Santos F (2012) From local to global dilemmas in social networks. PLoS613
One 7(2): e32114.614
49. Pinheiro FL, Santos FC, Pacheco JM (2012) How selection pressure changes the nature of social615
dilemmas in structured populations. New Journal of Physics 14: 073035.616
50. Erdo˝s P, Re´nyi A (1960) On the evolution of random graphs. Publ Math Inst Hung Acad Sci 5: 17-61.617
51. Newman MEJ, Watts DJ (1999) Scaling and percolation in the small-world network model. Physical618
Review E 60: 7332.619
52. Klemm K, Eguiluz VM (2002) Highly clustered scale-free networks. Physical Review E 65: 036123.620
Figure Legends621
0.3
0.
5
0.5
0.5
0.2
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.
2
0.5
0.3
0.7
0.5
0.3
Figure 1. A representative example of the broad class of circulation graphs. Note that the weights of
edges entering as well as those leaving any vertex all sum to 1.
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Figure 2. Average number of interactions as a function of the degree of the vertex for different types of
random heterogenous population structures: (A) Erdo´s-Re´nyi random graphs [50], (B) Newman-Watts
small-world networks [51]. (C) Baraba´si-Albert scale-free networks [39], and (D) Klemm-Eguiluz
highly-clustered scale-free networks [52]. All graphs have size N = 1000 and an average degree of d¯ = 10.
At each time step a randomly chosen individual interacts with a randomly selected neighbour. The average
number of interactions is shown for simulations (blue dots) and an analytical approximation for graphs
where the degrees of adjacent vertices are uncorrelated (red line, see Eq. (7)).
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Figure 3. Average fraction of strategy A for accumulated (top row) versus averaged (bottom row) payoffs
in homogenous (left column) and heterogeneous (middle column) populations as well as the difference
between them (right column) as a function of the game parameters S and T (see Table 1). In each panel
the four quadrants indicate the four basic types of generalized social dilemmas: prisoner’s dilemma (upper
left), snowdrift or co-existence games (upper right), stag hunt or coordination games (lower left) and
harmony games (lower right). Homogenous populations are represented by 50× 50 lattices with von
Neumann neighbourhood (degree d = 4) and heterogenous populations are represented by Baraba´si-Albert
scale-free networks (size N = 2500, average degree d¯ = 4). The population is updated according to the
imitation rule Eq. (8). The colours indicate the equilibrium fraction of strategy A (left and middle
columns) ranging from A dominates (blue), equal proportions (green), to B dominates (red). Increases in
equilibrium fractions due to heterogeneity are shown in blue shades (right column) and decreases in shades
of red. The intensity of the colour indicates the strength of the effect. Accumulated payoffs in heterogenous
populations shift the equilibrium in support of the more efficient strategy A except for harmony games
where A dominates in any case (bottom right quadrant). Conversely, for averaged payoffs the support of
strategy A is much weaker and even detrimental for T < 1 + S. Parameters: initial configuration is a
random distribution of equal proportions of strategies A and B; each simulation run follows 1.6 · 107
updates and the equilibrium frequency of A is averaged over the last 2.5 · 106 updates; results are averaged
over 500 independent runs; for scale-free networks the network is regenerated every 50 runs. No mutations
occured during the simulation run.
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Figure 4. A star graph has the hub in the centre surrounded by N leaf vertices. Using the matrix in
Table 2, an A type individual (blue) on the hub provides a benefit b to each leaf, regardless of whether the
payoffs are a accumulated or b averaged. For each interaction, the costs to the hub amount to c in the
accumulated case whereas only c/N in the averaged case. Conversely, the costs to a type A leaf are always
c and it provides a benefit b to the hub if payoffs are accumulated whereas only b/N when averaged. Hence
for averaged payoffs an A type hub provides a benefit to each leaf at a fraction of the costs while A type
leaves provide a fraction of the benefits to the hub. This means that the leaves and the hub are playing
different games. More specifically, the cost-to-benefit ratio of A leaves is Nc/b while it is c/(Nb) for an A
hub. For most of the population (the leaves), this ratio is much larger than for accumulated payoffs where
the cost-to-benefit ratio is c/b. As a consequence cooperation is much more challenging if payoffs are
averaged rather than accumulated.
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Figure 5. Criteria for evolutionary success on the star graph for accumulated (left column) and averaged
(right column) payoffs for weak selection, δ  1. The range for which A is advantageous (top row, c.f.
Eq. (14)) depends on the population size, N , and is shown in the limit N →∞ (solid line) and for N = 5
(dashed line). Below the respective lines A is favoured. Similarly, the range for which A and B mutants are
beneficial (c.f. Eq. (15)) also depends on N . B mutants are beneficial above the red lines, while A mutants
are beneficial below the blue lines (solid for N →∞; dashed for N = 5). Additive games (or
equal-gains-from-switching) satisfy S + T = 1 (dotted line).
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Figure 6. Average fraction of strategy A for different ratios between interactions and strategy updates in
homogenous (top row) and heterogeneous (middle row) populations and the difference between them
(bottom row) as a function of the game parameters S and T (c.f. Fig. 3). Interactions occur with
probability ω and strategy updates with 1− ω. For example, for ω = 0.9 each individual has, on average,
initiated 9 interactions between strategy updates but only an average of 1/9 interactions for ω = 0.1. For
small ω effects of heterogenous population structures have little chance to manifest themselves and the
results are closer to those for averaged payoffs (c.f. Fig. 3). In contrast, for large ω heterogeneity plays an
important role: for scale-free networks it is guided by the structural heterogeneity whereas in homogenous
populations another form of heterogeneity spontaneously emerges in the number of interactions. Even on
lattices, stochastic differences in the number of interactions get amplified by the dynamics because an
increased number of interactions reduces the chances that an individual updates its strategy (c.f. Fig. 7).
As a consequence the results for lattices and scale-free networks become increasingly similar but scale-free
networks keep promoting A types to a greater extend. Parameters and averaging technique are as in the
caption to Fig. 3.
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Figure 7. Distributions of the number of interactions on lattices (black ◦) and scale-free networks (blue
4) with a few interactions between updates (ω = 0.02 or, on average, ≈ 0.02 interactions) and b many
interactions between updates (ω = 0.98 or, on average, 49 interactions). For small ω the heterogeneity of
scale-free networks results in a pronounced tail at higher numbers of interactions compared to the
approximately exponential distribution for lattices. This tail is responsible for the reduction of cooperation
in scale-free networks observed in Fig. 6: as interactions dominate, some vertices almost never update their
strategies. This ”static network” emerges in both lattices and scale-free graphs and prevents the complete
proliferation of the rare strategy. Nevertheless, most of the individuals in the population experience
essentially the same number of interactions. The distributions look different for large ω but the main
difference remains that scale-free networks produce a more pronounced tail. More importantly, however,
for most of the population the distributions are actually very similar and hence the heterogeneities very
similar. On lattices, the skewed distribution is caused by stochastic variations and the positive feedback
between the number of interactions and the resilience to changing strategy.
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Figure 8. Impact of the time scale relation ω on the equilibrium fractions of cooperators in the Sω-plane
for additive prisoner’s dilemma games (T = 1− S): a lattices and b scale-free networks. The limit ω → 0
recovers the neutral process (no interactions) whereas for ω → 1 individuals hardly update their strategies.
Thus, in both of the two limiting cases the fraction of cooperators remains at the initial value of 0.5. For
both types of population structures there exists an intermediate ω that leads to an optimal level of
cooperation. On lattices the support for cooperation is strongest if interactions and strategy updates occur
at equal rates, ω = 0.5, but on scale-free networks more frequent updates than interactions are even more
beneficial, ω ≈ 0.25. Parameters and averaging technique are as in the caption to Fig. 3.
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